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          CR-2015-2656 
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      Issue 
Has Camperud failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, 
either by denying her request to continue sentencing a third time so that she could 
complete the mental health evaluation for which she had previously failed to appear, or 
by imposing concurrent unified sentences of three years, with one and one-half years 
fixed, upon her guilty pleas to three counts of felony issuing a check without funds? 
 
 
Camperud Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 In May 2015, the state charged Camperud with grand theft, misappropriation of 
personal identifying information, and four counts of felony issuing a check without funds.  
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(R., pp.33-35.)  In July 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, Camperud pled guilty to 
three counts of felony issuing a check without funds, and the state dismissed the 
remaining charges and agreed to recommend an aggregate sentence of nine years, 
with three years fixed.  (R., p.47; Tr., p.1, Ls.13-19.)  The district court ordered 
substance abuse and mental health evaluations and set sentencing for August 27, 
2015.  (R., p.47; Tr., p.13, Ls.10-14.)   
Camperud failed to appear for her evaluations at Family Services and 
rescheduled her presentence interview twice, after showing up late and unprepared on 
the first date and cancelling approximately 20 minutes before the interview on the 
second date.  (PSI, p.18.1)  When she finally did appear for her presentence interview 
on August 6, 2015, Camperud had still not completed her questionnaire and appeared 
to be “under the influence during her interview.”  (PSI, p.18.)   
On August 27, 2015, Camperud appeared in court for sentencing and requested 
a continuance, which the district court granted.  (R., p.57.)  At the next scheduled 
sentencing hearing, Camperud appeared and again requested a continuance.  (R., 
p.58.)  The state objected to another continuance and requested that the district court 
revoke Camperud’s bond, advising it believed Camperud was “delaying this process.”  
(R., p.58.)  The court declined to revoke Camperud’s bond and continued sentencing a 
second time, but advised Camperud that sentencing would go forward on the next 
scheduled date.  (R., p.58.)  On September 10, 2015, Camperud appeared in court and 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Camperud 
43575 psi.pdf.”   
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requested that sentencing be continued a third time because she had still failed to 
complete her substance abuse and mental health evaluations.  (R., p.59; Tr., p.21, L.22 
– p.22, L.6.)  The district court denied Camperud’s request for a third continuance, 
noting that Camperud had been uncooperative with the presentence process, failed to 
appear for her evaluations, and failed to reschedule the evaluations in a timely manner.  
(R., p.59; Tr., p.23, L.16 – p.24, L.16.)  The court also concluded that there was 
sufficient information with respect to Camperud’s mental health issues contained in the 
presentence materials, which included information from a prior mental health evaluation.  
(Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.23; PSI, p.278.)  The district court imposed concurrent unified 
sentences of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, for the three counts of 
felony issuing a check without funds.  (R., pp.61-63.)  Camperud filed a notice of appeal 
timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.69-71.)   
Camperud asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her 
request to continue sentencing a third time so that she could complete the mental health 
evaluation for which she had previously failed to appear, in light of her claim that her 
“history and the context of the instant offenses reveals a pattern of escalating mental 
health issues.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-8.)    
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 706, 864 P.2d 149, 152 
(1993).  When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the inquiry involves (1) 
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its 
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decision by an exercise of reason.  Id.; Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 
119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 32(d), “the decision as to whether to order a psychological 
evaluation is to be made by the sentencing judge.”  A psychological evaluation is not 
required in every case where the defendant claims some mental illness or disability. 
State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822, 229 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2010).  Rather, 
the decision of whether to obtain a psychological evaluation lies within the sentencing 
court's discretion.  Id.  A district court's election to not order a psychological evaluation 
will be upheld on appeal if the record can support a finding that there was no reason to 
believe the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing or if 
the information already before the court adequately met the requirements of section I.C. 
§ 19–2522(3).   Id.   
In this case, the district court provided Camperud with the opportunity to 
participate in a mental health evaluation, but Camperud failed to appear for her 
evaluation appointment and failed to reschedule her appointment in a timely manner, 
although she had sufficient time to do so.  (PSI, p.18; Tr., p.23, Ls.19-25; p.24, Ls.13-
16.)  She was also largely uncooperative with the presentence interview process and 
failed to sign a “Release of Information” form so that the presentence investigator could 
obtain Camperud’s mental health records.  (PSI, pp.14, 18.)  The court had already 
continued the sentencing hearing twice – the second time over the state’s objection – by 
the time Camperud finally decided to reschedule her evaluation.  (R., pp.57-59.)  When 
Camperud requested a third continuance so that she could complete the untimely 
evaluation, the district court noted that the presentence materials already contained 
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information regarding Camperud’s mental health issues, and asked whether a new 
evaluation would provide any information that had not already been addressed.  (Tr., 
p.25, Ls.14-17.)  Camperud’s counsel did not indicate that any new or different 
information would be obtained, but merely stated that an update “might be helpful.”  (Tr., 
p.25, Ls.18-22.)  Likewise, in her own comments to the court, Camperud did not indicate 
that she felt her mental health issues had escalated, but rather focused on her need for 
“med-management,” something she was apparently unable to obtain in the community.  
(Tr., p.34, Ls.12-24.)   
On appeal, Camperud claims that “the context of the instant offenses indicates 
[her] pattern of escalating mental health issues has continued.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-
8.)  That Camperud’s mental health diagnosis changed once2 when she between the 
ages of 20 and 25, from Major Depressive Disorder to Bipolar I Disorder, does not 
establish a pattern of “escalating mental health issues.”  (PSI, pp.1, 466, 485, 278, 394-
96.)  Nor does the context of the instant offenses – purportedly that she “was not on 
[her] right meds,” “did not know how to cope” with changes in her life, and only “wrote 
those checks for food” – indicate that Camperud’s mental health issues had escalated 
since her last psychological evaluation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8; PSI, pp.5, 16.)  In 
fact, Camperud told the presentence investigator that she chose to stop taking “all of 
her medication” because she “no longer wanted to take them while pregnant.”  (PSI, 
p.13.)  She acknowledged that her substance abuse exacerbates her mental health 
                                            
2 Camperud was apparently diagnosed with ADHD “as a child” and, although she was 
diagnosed with Bulimia Nervosa in 2005, this was “in early full remission” as she 
reported that she “started binging and purging as a teenager, but that she had “not done 
so in several years.”  (PSI, pp.394-96.)  As such, these were not “new” mental health 
issues with an onset between the years of 2000 and 2007. 
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issues, but told the court that she used methamphetamine to “get off” her (legal) 
medication, and that that decision led her to commit the instant offenses “because [she] 
was high, and [her] judgment was clouded.”  (Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.34, L.5.)  As such, it 
would appear that the “context” of the instant offense was related more to Camperud’s 
decision to use illegal substances in lieu of her legal prescription medications than it 
was to any escalation of her mental health diagnoses.   
Furthermore, to the extent that the “context” of the instant offenses includes 
Camperud’s attempt to excuse her behavior by claiming that she only “wrote those 
checks for food” because she “needed food and literaly [sic] only bought food.  [She] 
didn’t buy anything extra,” this claim is entirely disingenuous.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8; 
PSI, p.5.)  According to the police reports, Camperud wrote more than 36 checks, 
totaling at least $2,588.73, over a period of just 10 days.  (PSI, p.36.)  At least two of the 
checks were written to D&B Supply, in the amounts of $492.51 and $266.38, for 
merchandise that does not appear to include any food items, but rather were for 
numerous clothing items, boots/shoes, knives, and tools.  (PSI, pp.124, 126-27, 129.)  
Camperud’s lack of candor with respect to the reasons she committed the instant 
offenses does not indicate that her mental health diagnoses had changed.   
In objecting to Camperud’s motion for a third continuance, the state argued: 
Ms. Camperud seems to have a new reason why we need to continue the 
sentencing every week.  The state’s offer from the get-go has been for 
imprisonment based on her extensive criminal history and, essentially, 
committing the exact same offenses throughout.  To the extent that she 
could benefit from programming to address her mental-health needs, that 
is all information that can be handled at RDU, and so I would object to 
delaying these proceedings anymore.  This is entirely Ms. Camperud’s 
fault that these things haven’t been done. 
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(Tr., p.24, L.18 – p.25, L.3.)  The district court acted within its discretion when it denied 
Camperud’s third motion to continue the sentencing hearing, reasonably determining 
that it had before it sufficient information with respect to Camperud’s mental health 
issues.  The court stated: 
  I’ve had an opportunity to review the presentence report, which 
includes the previous presentence report.  It does contain information 
related to her mental health, and, quite frankly, those conditions are not 
the types of conditions that somehow just go away even over the course 
of time.   
 
For this particular offense of issuing checks without funds, I 
understand that mental health may be a significant factor or may be an 
issue in considering any rehabilitative treatment that may be available, 
and it is proper for the court to consider rehabilitation of the offender as 
one of the factors it considers in fashioning a sentence.   
 
However, for these particular crimes, it’s not a significant factor of 
my sentencing that if she has retained the same mental-health conditions 
that she’s had in the past, quite frankly, I just don’t see it either elevating 
or reducing the court’s sentencing at this particular point, and I do find that 
I have sufficient information.   
 
  While she was provided an opportunity to provide it, she did not in a 
timely manner, and I don’t find it’s necessary at this point for me to have 
any additional evaluation before I proceed to sentencing, so I’m not going 
to allow additional time to now do those evaluations which have not been 
done in the past. 
 
(Tr., p.25, L.23 – p.26, L.23.)   
 At the time that she requested a third continuance of her sentencing hearing, 
Camperud did not provide any information to indicate that her mental health diagnoses 
had changed.  With respect to the context of the instant offenses, Camperud’s crimes in 
the instant case were very similar to many of her past crimes (fraud-no account check, 
nonsufficient funds check, and forgery), which she also blamed on her inability to cope 
with difficulties in her life and substance abuse.  (PSI, pp.6, 271-72, 421-22, 461, 466.)  
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Camperud also has a history of failing to follow through with treatment 
recommendations and/or requirements while in the community, and of instead choosing 
to resume her abuse of illegal substances, which she knows exacerbates her mental 
health issues.  (PSI, pp.15, 278-81, 396-99, 412, 415, 419, 447, 463.)  That Camperud 
reverted to her old patterns of behavior, choosing to abuse illegal drugs rather than 
seeking out community-based resources and subsequently blaming her criminal activity 
on her substance abuse and falsely claiming that she only committed the crimes to 
purchase food, is not a “context” that supports her claim that she has mental health 
issues that have changed so much as to necessitate a new mental health evaluation.  
The district court reasonably concluded that it had sufficient information to meet the 
requirements of section I.C. § 19–2522(3), and that a third continuance of sentencing 
was not warranted, particularly because Camperud herself did not find an updated 
evaluation important enough either to appear for her appointment, or to reschedule her 
missed appointment in a timely manner.  Camperud has failed to establish that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying her third request to continue her 
sentencing hearing.   
Camperud next asserts her sentences are excessive, in light of her substance 
abuse, mental health issues, and purported remorse and acceptance of responsibility.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.)  The record supports the sentences imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
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fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for felony issuing a check without funds is three 
years.  I.C. § 18-3106(a).  The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 
three years, with one and one-half years fixed, which fall well within the statutory 
guidelines.  (R., pp.61-63.)  At sentencing, the state addressed the serious and ongoing 
nature of the offenses, Camperud’s repeated attempts to avoid accountability by 
blaming others, her ongoing criminal offending, her history of failing to appear and 
violating the terms of community supervision, her failure to rehabilitate or be deterred 
despite numerous prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions, and the risk she 
presents to society.  (Tr., p.28, L.1 – p.29, L.22.)  The state submits that Camperud has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached 
excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s decision to 
deny Camperud’s third motion to continue her sentencing hearing and Camperud’s 
convictions and sentences. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming_____________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of February, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
BEN P. MCGREEVY  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming         _________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
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1 RDU, and sol would obj eel to delaying these proceedings 1 to her mental health, and, quite frankly, U1ose 
2 anymore. This is entirely Ms. Camper11rl's fault that 2 conditions arc not the types of conditions that somehow 
3 these tl1ings haven't been done. 3 just go away even over the course of time. 
4 THR COTJRT: Mr. ::ltP.Veley, would you like to be 4 For this pruticular offense of Issuing checks 
6 heard in response to that? 6 without funds, I understand that mental health may be a 
G MR. STEVELEY: Judge, I'm convinced, having 6 significant factor or may be an issue in cunsi<lel'ing any 
7 spent considerable time on the phone and in person with 7 rehabilitative treatment that may be available, and it 
8 Ms. Camperud, that there are some substantial 8 Is proper for the court to consi<ler rehabilitation of 
9 mental-health issues, and J just don't think that going 9 the offender as one of the factors It considers in 
10 forward on a sentencing where the state is asking for 10 fashioning a sentence. 
11 imprisonment without the court being aware of what those 11 However, for these particular crimes, it's not a 
12 issues arc, would be · · would serve any purpose, and so 12 significant factor of my sentencing that if she has 
13 we arc asking for the continuance. 13 retained the sumc menlal-health C'JJ11ditions that 11he's 
14 THE COURT: How Is this different than the 14 had in the past, quite frankly, I ju.,t don't see it 
16 materials that have already been addressed in the 16 either elevating or reducing the court's sentencing at 
16 presentence reports, in the previous presentence 16 this particular point, and I do find that I have 
17 reports? 17 sufficient information. 
18 MR. STEVELEY: I agree that there are materials 18 While she was provided an opportunity to provide 
19 within the contents of the presentence repurt that refer 19 it, she did not in a timely manner, and I don't find 
20 to mental-health issues, but we don't have an update, 20 it'i; necessary at this point for me to have any 
21 and I think it might be helpful to the cuurt lo have a 21 acldltional evaluation before l proceed to sentencing, so 
22 psych eval. 22 I'm not going to allow additional time to now do those 
23 'fHE COURT: I've ha<l 1111 opportunity to review 23 evaluations which huve not been done in the past. 
24 the presentence repo1t, which includes the previous 24 Is there any victim-impact statement or 
25 presentence report. It does contain Information related 26 additional evidence or testimony, Mr. Vogt? 
25 :l6 
1 MR. VOGT: No, Yow· Honor. 1 Along with the instant case, Ms. Camperud has 
2 THE COURT: Okny. Mr. Vogt, you can argue. 2 felony convictions for insufficient funds check from 
3 MR. VOGT: Thank you. 3 2002, issuing checks without fwids in 2002. PCS with 
4 Pursuant to our plea agreement, Your Honor, I am 4 intent In 2007, as well as a simple possession in 2007 
6 asking the court today to enter a judgment of 5 and a forgery In 2007. There's been multiple probation 
6 t.onvietion, 11nd, 11tarting with Count l, I'm asking the 6 and parole violations on those felonies. She has a 
7 con rt to Impose a 3-ycnr sentence with zero yca1'6 -- 7 number of misdemeanors as wdl. I won't go through the 
8 well, 3 years·· excuse me·· a 3-year determinate, zero 8 laundry list of them but u doien or so misdemeanors as 
9 years indetenninate. In Count 2, I'd ask you to run 9 well. 
10 this consecutive to Count 1 and to order a zero plus 3 10 And, the facts of this case, really throughout 
11 in Count 3, a zero plus 3 to run consecutive to Counts 1 11 2014, Ms. Campcrud victimized her family nnd 10<'.nl 
12 and 2, so for an aggregate of 3 plus 6 for 9. I'm 12 businesses, boU1 by using her grandmother's Identity to 
1~ asking the court to consider orderlng Ms. Camperud to 13 open charge accounts and by passing a large number of 
14 pay a fine and court costs, to order public defender 14 checks from those accounts that belonged to her 
15 reimbursement, takinx iuto account Lhe multiple re.~ets 16 ex-husband, or now ex-husbond, and this isn't really her 
18 we've had in this case. I'm also seeking restitution In 16 first rodeo. This is behavior that's repeated itself 
17 this case in the amount of $3,638.55 to D & Il Supply, 17 over time, and she's been sanctioned repeatedly, and yet 
18 Mave1ik and Jack.sons as separate victim~. [ have a 18 she returns to the same criminal thinking and processes. 
19 proposed order for COlUi and counsel. 19 It's concerning that she also consistently plays 
20 MR. STEVELEY: Yow· Honor, I'm sorry. I missed 20 the victim In her crimes. It's always somebo<ly dse's 
21 •• there it is. Got it. Thank you. 21 fault or she's entitled to these things. She's been 
22 TH~ COURT: Is there any objection to the 22 given the benefit of substuntial family support, 
23 request for victim restitution? 23 multiple treatment opportunities, in both the community 
24 MR. STEVELEY: No, Your Honor. 24 and the institution; yel, she continues to commit the 
26 MR. VOGT: Thank you. 215 same crimes. Aud, from the state's view, it'1111ndo11hted 
27 28 
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State v. Ryann D. Camnerud 
1 that if she's left in the community, she'll victimize 
2 others. 
3 She missed PSI appointments, failed to complete 
4 the app1'0priate paperwork. Quite frankly, was dishonest 
5 with the PSI auU1or about her work history. She was 
8 deceptive with respect to her housing, and thls Is also 
7 something that's consistent throughout the prior PSis. 
8 While she claims she wants to provide for her 
9 children, it's clear from the PSI, that she's not really 
1 o played an active role in the supporting or raising these 
11 children, and, even by her own admission, she's 
12 continued to use during the pcndency ofthis case. 
13 She's failed to appear in the district courts, and, 
14 quite frankly, from the PSI auUior's view, she appeared 
16 high when she came to the PSI interview. 
16 So, for all of those reasons, Your Honor, Ms. 
17 Campemd is not II goo<l r.anclidate for community•hasecl 
18 supervision. She's earned a prison sentence, given the 
19 fact that she commits Uie same crime repeatedly, and, 
20 quite frankly, ha.c: victimir,e a large numher of people, 
21 so I'd ask the court to order the sentence I have laid 
22 out. Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. 
24 Mc. Steveley, would you like to be heard? 
2S MR. STEVELEY: Yes. Thanks, Juc.lge. 
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1 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Steveley. 
2 MR. STEVELEY: Judge, in addition to the 
3 appointment that she set up for mental-hea!Ui eval next 
4 Tuesday with Ascent counseling, she ulso hus dasses 
5 beginning with Ascent counseling starting next Friday. 
6 She's also now secured a place to live. She's also 
7 secured a financial soucce to begin as a student at a 
8 Bible college. She's also begwi paying back restitution 
9 at ~oo a month towards the $3,600 tltat she owes on this 
10 case. 
11 It's her position, Judge, that she committed 
12 these crimes out of a feeling of desperation. In the 
13 report, it's clear from her own self-analysis' view, 
14 that she feels horrible about thls and is very 
15 disappointed in herself. It's her position, Judge, 
16 that, a!Uiough no stealing is right or good, that most 
17 of the nmds that she stole or used, !think, the 
18 Issuing checks without funds, were for food. She did 
19 previously successfully complete a rider in 2002. She 
20 previously successfully completed the therapeutic 
21 community program in 2005, 
22 She's very close with her father who is here 
23 today and has been with her at all of her court dates, 
24 She has also obtained GED. She has some job skJlls In 
26 retrul as well as mobile communications. I believe she 
31 
Pe11ny Tardiff. c;sR #712 • (208) 287-7588 
1 Judge, I'd like to furnish the court with a 
2 number of certificates of completion of courses that 
3 she's taken over the years. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Aie those copies or 
6 originals? 
6 MR. STEVBLEY: These are originals, Judge. 
7 THE COURT: Does the state have any objection to 
8 me considering these? 
9 MR. VOGT: I looked at Uiem briefly, Your Honor. 
10 I don't object to the cou1t considering them. If the 
11 court wants to make copies of it to append to the PSI, I 
12 don't object to that either. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. l'm not going to keep these. 
14 I will review them. 
16 MR. STEVELEY: Thank you, Judge. 
16 THE COURT: Many are related to the meth project 
17 and other programs that she's completed. Some of these 
18 I recognize from the certificate. It includes her time 
19 that would have been setved in different institutional 
20 settings. 
21 MR. S'l'I.WELEY: That's correct, Judge. 
22 THE COURT: I'll let the bailiff make a copy of 
23 those before we return them to Ms. Camperud, and then 
24 we'll append them to the PSI. 
25 MR. STEVELEY: Thank you. 
30 
1 still has a job with Sprint, and once worked for them 
2 for over five years. 
3 She suffers from arthritis, MS and back pain. 
4 She said she was diagnosed as bipolar back in 2007, and, 
5 unfortunately, has had three attempted suicides. She 
6 also suffers from PTSD, and, she indicates that during 
1 the c.:0U1'1ie of her life, i;he had been raped, beaten and 
8 pistol-whipped. She believes that she does need 
9 mental-health counseling, and she's taken the steps to 
10 go ahead and do that. 
11 Her biggest substance-abuse issues are or have 
12 been with prescription pain killers. She acknowledges 
13 that her substance-abuse issues exacerbate her 
14 mental-health issues anc.1 that's generally the ca.se in 
1 S most du11l diugnosis siluutions, w1d she does agre11 tit al 
16 she needs additional treatment for those substance-abuse 
17 issues as well. 
18 She is interested and will at some point start 
19 the process of enrolling in Dible college. She 
20 acknowledges that she's very week in dealing with her 
21 emotions and loss, and I think part of that goes to her 
22 mental-health issues as well. She was a volunteer at 
23 the mcth project for recovedng drug users and 
24 previously did complete a parole. 
26 As I pointed out earlier, Judge, I think that my 
32 
Page 29 to 32 or 38 8 ot 10 sheets 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
